I examined the printer's copy of the manuscript of Part II on a visit to the Russell Archives during the summer of 1985 and found that §128, in its published form, is entirely new. Indeed, the subject-matter ofthe two versions is different. In the printer's copy, Russell considers, I Kenneth Blackwell, "Part 1 of The Principles of Mathematics", Russell, n.s. 4 (Winter 1984-85 
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The Principles of Mathematics, Part II 61 and fundamentally accepts, the objection that logicism, as regards the cardinal numbers, fails because the equivalence classes, which are to be identified with the numbers, cannot exist in a theory which adequately handles the Contradictions. Having discovered these significant divergences between printer's copy and published text, I decided it would be well worthwhile to do a complete collation of Part II. I twice read a photocopy of the printer's copy of the manuscript line by line against the text of the first impression of The Principles ofMathematics. The first impression was chosen since the purpose of the collation was to bring to light how Russell's views developed in the crucial months when he first studied Frege carefully, and the extent of correction and even revision in the subsequent eight impressions until 1972 is unknown. There are substantial alterations in Part II, amounting to approximately 1,100 words of text.
3 By comparison, the list of variants for Part I, which is over twice as long as Part II, comprises 1,900 words in passages not appearing in the published text. The major changes are found in Chapter XV, "The Addition of Terms and the Addition of Classes". This is the first, and longest, of three chapters in Part II which consider the philosophical questions raised by the mathematical theory of cardinal numbers set out in Chapters XI to XIV. Section 128 of Chapter xv is, as I said earlier, essentially new, and §I32, the final and summary section, overlaps the printer's copy only in its initial two sentences.
A list of substantive, or verbal, variants is given below. I have followed Blackwell's model in its construction. It is read as follows. At the left is a number such as II I: 8. This means page I II, line 8 from the top. To the right there is first the reading from the first impression of the published text, followed by a square bracket. The words after the bracket are the corresponding final manuscript reading. Editorial brackets enclose my comments. There are many additions and deletions on the manuscript itself, but they fall outside the scope of the textual series to which my study belongs.
The initial leaf of the printer's copy is dated June 1901 by Russell. This places its composition a month after the composition of what Blackwell calls the penultimate version of Part I, whose first leaf is dated May 1901. At the upper left-hand corner of each leaf is the notation "Nc", Russell's way of indicating the Part to which these leaves belong. The leaves are numbered consecutively, I to 86. Several leaves have two numbers, indicating that Russell had removed them from ear-lier work. There are indications, however, of some revision subsequent to June 1901. As noted, Russell had not recognized fully the problems posed by the Contradictions in May 1901. This is manifested in the fact that the penultimate version of Part 1 contains no chapter on that subject. It is doubtful that the version of Part II written one month later would attribute great importance to them. However, the printer's copy of § §I28 and 132 claims that the Contradictions pose grave problems for the logicist view that numbers are classes of similar classes fos. 44, 53) . Also at several places, Russell makes interlinear insertions that involve the Contradictions fos. 57, 60, 64, 67, 85) . These insertions are in pencil where the remainder of the manuscript is written in ink. I conclude by briefly discussing the character of the most significant alterations. The collation brings out that all references to Frege in Part II were introduced after May 1902. This includes both issues of philosophical substance ( §I28, §132) and matters of acknowledgement (pp. III: 8, 142: 10). Outside the Appendices, there are just five other references to Frege in Principles. Two footnotes in Part 1 (pp. 68, 76) do not occur in the printer's copy and so postdate May 1902. Another footnote occurs in Part VI at page 451. The portion of the printer's copy which includes this section is missing. The footnote acknowledges Frege as a common proponent of the view that numbers are mindindependent entities and cites Grundgesetze I, p. XVII. There are two references to Frege in Part 1 which are found in the printer's copy. One occurs in the body of the text at page 19, where Russell groups Frege and Peano as logicians who clearly distinguished the membership relation from the subset relation. In a footnote, Russell cites Grundgesetze I, by page number (p. 2), and Grundlagen with no page citation. The remaining reference in the printer's copy occurs in a footnote on page 35 of the published text. There Russell writes, "Frege (loc. cit.) has a special symbol to denote assertion." It is reasonable to suppose that the relevant citation here is to Grundgesetze I, §S. On page 19, Russell has cited both Grundgesetze and Grundlagen, but no special symbol is introduced to denote assertion in Grundlagen. Such a symbol is introduced and discussed early in Grundgesetze 1 at §5 (pp. 9-10). Russell's copy of GrundgeselZe I, which is to be found in the Russell Archives, contains extended marginal comments on this section, and these comments echo remarks made in the section of Principles where the footnote occurs. This pattern coheres well with Russell's own account of his knowledge of Frege's work. In his famous initial letter to Frege on 16 June 1902 Russell writes: "For a year and a half I have been acquainted with your Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, but it is only now that I have been able to find the time for the thorough study I intended to make of your work." Later in the letter, he adds: "I already have your books or shall buy them soon, but I would be very grateful if you could send me reprints of your articles in various periodicals."9 As we see, all citations in the body of Principles are to Frege's books, and all but three at most postdate May 1902.10 Indeed the only citations by page number are to pages in the Preface and Introduction of Grundgesetze I. Again, this fits with Russell's recollection of the matter. In Portraits from Memory, he recalls being led to purchase the Grundgesetze by Peano's review which, 8 There are two relevant marginal comments. The first is appended to the initial paragraph of §S. It reads: "In grammar, assertion is distinguished by the indicative verb, the mere proposition apart from its assertion, being best expressed by a verbal noun." The second attaches to the final paragraph of the section. It reads: "Assertion is thus something new over and above truth and falsehood. This is obviously correct: if P is a proposition, 'the truth of P' is not the same as 'P is true'." 
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The collation reveals Russell's attempts to bring Frege's views to the defence of logicism. This occurs at § §128 and 132 of the published text, where Russell invokes Frege's view that "one" is not a property of objects, but of concepts. This view is called upon in response to an objection set out three times in Chapter xv-namely, that logicism illicitly and circularly presupposes the concept "one" through its employment of the concept "a term" (see 130: 10-14, 132: 12-16, 135: 36-40) . 13 The published text contains two replies of questionable compatibility. In §127, a section which contains only minor changes from the printer's copy, Russell attempts to meet the objection by distinguishing between what is implied by the concept "a term" and what is presupposed in it. He admits "one" is implied in the concept "a term", because every term is one. But, Russell claims, this does not yield vicious circularity, because we may consistently deny that the concept "a term" presupposes the concept "one". The distinction between implication and presupposition is one which Russell has already put to crucial use in Principles: it is an essential element in his reply to Bradley's relational regress (pp. 51,99-100).
The material, incorporated in § §128 and 132 at the proofreading stage, offers a rather different reply. It, in effect, denies that there is a problem to be solved. The source of the circularity argument is alleged to be the acknowledgement that it is true to say of every term \I For Peano's review, see Victor Dudman, "Peano's Review of Frege's Grundgesetze", Southern Journal of Philosophy, 9 (1971) : 25-37· 12 Russell's copy of Grundgesetze contains marginal comments of the sort his recollections would suggest. In the Preface, the marginal notes include: "Hear Hear!", "Excellent!", "Good", and "Splendid". II, 152: 27 .) The reason for pessimism is that one of Russell's first attempts to resolve the Contradictions had the consequence that, for instance, the class of all trios could be regarded only as a class as many and not as a class as one. It is thus unsatisfactory to identify this class (as many) with the number 3, since the number 3 standardly functions in Arithmetic as a single entity.
Russell's early reaction to the Contradictions was that theIr source lay in permitting variation over such items as propositional functions. This diagnosis occurs in Russell's first letter to Frege: "There is just one point where I have encountered a difficulty. You state (p. 17) that a function, too, can act as an indeterminate element. This I formerly believed, but now this view seems doubtful to me because of the following contradiction."ls But, of course, ban on such variation takes with it the classes with which Russell had identified the cardinal numbers. And this is the core of the objection set out in the deleted §128. (See the list of variants, [132] [133] In the published text of Part I, Russell argues that variation over propositional functions must be allowed on a variety of grounds 14 Russell's notes on Grundlagen nicely reveal his ambivalence concerning Frege's views about those concepts which the medievals labelled "transcendental" (e.g. existence, number). He notes Frege's view that numbers are properties of concepts and the application of this idea to the concept "existence", construed by Frege as denying the appli· cation of o. This, Frege says, is the source of the failure of the ontological argument. To these comments, Russell appends the editorial remark: Mistake. See RA
230.03042Q-F2.
I have here maligned Frege's view somewhat to make the contrast with Russell's early views striking. Frege held that ascriptions of number are ascriptions of concepts to concepts, but that the numbers themselves are objects. 15 Frege, p. 130.
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(104: 2-II). This admission is followed by two attempts at a more satisfactory resolution. One idea is to sort out a class of propositional functions, called quadratic forms, which cause problems because function and argument cannot vary independently (104: 13-30) . The other is a primitive statement of the theory of types (104: 42-105: 15) . As Blackwell's collation shows, neither of these proposals is found in the printer's copy. 16 The proposal about quadratic forms was sent to the printer on 25 June 1902 with the note: "To be added at the end of § 10 3" (Blackwell, p. 288) . One assumes that the type-theoretic solution is later and was developed later in conjunction with Appendix B.17
The pessimism of the deleted sections is gone from the published version of Part II. Section 132, the summary section of Chapter xv, concludes: "Thus it appeared that no philosophical argument could overthrow the mathematical theory of cardinal numbers set forth in Chapters XI to XIV." (The use of "appeared" is admittedly disconcerting.) Other summary statements, in Part II and later, are similar in tone (15 2 : 25-7,497: 9-12). Nevertheless, Russell could scarcely have failed to raise the question as to how these new resolutions affect the identification of number with classes of similar classes. And indeed, in Appendix B, Russell admits that numbers, as standardly conceived, fit nowhere in the hierarchy of types and that the definitions offered in Part II of particular numbers (e.g. "0") will not suffice. He concedes there that he has no clear idea about how to carry out the required definitions within the new framework. 18 view of classes, as we saw in Part I, a class of only one term must be identified with that one term; hence, if formalism requires a distinction to be made, it is essential to substitute either the class-concept or the concept of the class for the class itself. But in this there is a difficulty, since we must choose, as the class-concepts which are to be numbers, concepts which are determinate when the classes are given. Such concepts will be "member of the class of couples" or "of trios" or etc. That is, having defined, by any predicate, a certain class u, we can form the class-concept "member of u", and this is determinate when u is given. It must be class-concepts of this nature, and not classes themselves, that are numbers; unless, indeed, other class-concepts, defining the same classes, can be found, which are also uniquely determined when the class is given. objection to our definition of cardinal number may be based on the conclusion which we found necessary in Chapter XII of Part I for the solution of the contradiction. For we have to vary classes and relations in order to obtain our definition, and thus we do not necessarily obtain as a number an entity which can be treated as a single logical subject. Philosophically, this is a serious objection, for it shows that we must find a classconcept corresponding to the class of classes similar 10 a given class, and that this classconcept cannot be derived from the actual definition of the class of classes concerned, because this definition has the formal characteristics which prevent it from insuring the existence of a corresponding class-concept. Thus numbers, it would seem, philosophically though not formally, will have to be readmitted as indefinables. 134: 1-:-2 notion of a numerical conjunction, or more shortly, a collection.) notion of a collection.
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134: 3 to begin with,] at least to begin with, 134: 20 not one.] not one.~We have to consider, then, the conection A and B and C and etc., where A, B, C, etc. are each one.
Since we do not want to presuppose number in this discussion, it may be well to express what is equivalent to the condition that each should be one in form free from reference to the number one. This can be done by a consideration of the nature of the terms which are one. Now in the first place, all indefinable simple terms are each one: points, instants, numbers, particular shades of colour, etc. But many other terms are one. A series, a planet, a man, a society, are each one in some sense. To go into this sense at length would take us too far from our subject. But the fonowing general statement seems irrefutable: If A is one without being simple, then A is other than all its constituents together: it is a whole, which, in virtue of the relations contained in it, is different from all the parts of which it consists. All wholes are of this nature: every whole is one, and every conection of terms, except certain infinite collections, composes a whole. I shall return to this subject later; for the present I remark merely the fonowing property of whatever 
